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Deposit Games with Reinvestment
Gerwald van Gulick1,2, Peter Borm1, Anja De Waegenaere1, Ruud Hendrickx1,3
Abstract
In a deposit game coalitions are formed by players combining their capital. The proceeds of
their investments then have to be divided among those players. The current model extends
earlier work on capital deposits by allowing reinvestment of returns. Two specific subclasses
of deposit games are introduced. It is seen that each term dependent deposit game possesses a
core element. Capital dependent deposit games are also shown to have a core element and even
a population monotonic allocation scheme if the revenue function exhibits increasing returns
to scale. Furthermore, it is shown that all superadditive games are deposit games if one allows
for debt.
JEL classification: C71
Keywords: cooperative game theory, deposit games, core elements, population monotonic allo-
cation schemes, superadditive games
1 Introduction
A deposit problem is a decision problem where an individual has a certain amount of capital at
his disposal to deposit at a bank. This individual aims to maximise the return on his investment.
When we allow for cooperation between individuals by means of joint investment, they can increase
their joint return. However, this gives rise to the additional question of how to allocate the proceeds
among the individuals. In this paper, we analyse cooperation in deposit situations and in particular,
we explore whether an allocation exists such that all players will want to cooperate and form the
grand coalition.
Deposit games have previously been studied by Borm, De Waegenaere, Rafels, Suijs, Tijs, and
Timmer (2001), Tan (2000) and De Waegenaere, Suijs, and Tijs (2005). Borm et al. (2001) define
a deposit as a fixed amount of capital at a bank for a certain amount of time, and use a revenue
function that describes the revenue of a deposit in a fixed end period, after which no more deposits
can be made. In particular, they do not allow for reinvestment of intermediate revenue. Tan (2000)
extends this approach and adds the possibility of borrowing.
The approach of De Waegenaere et al. (2005) is more general. They allow reinvestment and a
broader range of investment products than deposits. Among other things, the money invested in a
single investment product is allowed to change every period, rather than being a fixed amount of
capital. The drawback of this approach is that because of its generality, it is harder to draw firm
conclusions.
Lemaire (1983) and Izquierdo and Rafels (1996) analyse related issues. Lemaire (1983) gives an
overview of the use of game theory in financial issues. Izquierdo and Rafels (1996) analyse games
that are related to capital dependent deposit games.
1CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University.
2Corresponding author: P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, E-mail: G.vanGulick@uvt.nl.
3This author acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).
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In this paper we take the approach that reinvestment should be possible, while still allowing for a
particular form of the revenue function. We start by modelling the decisions of individuals during
a discrete and finite number of periods of time. Any deposit will lead to a non-negative revenue.
This non-negativity condition is justified because, by the nature of deposits, it is always possible
to privately save any amount of money at no cost. There will be no default risk involved in any
deposit.
We allow coalitions of individuals to deposit money jointly by cooperating. Clearly, the revenue
of a coalition will never be lower than the sum of all individual revenues. We are interested in
finding a core element, i.e. we want an allocation for the grand coalition such that no subcoalition
has any incentive to split off.
Particular forms of the revenue function are explored by introducing two subclasses: term
dependent deposit games and capital dependent deposit games. These classes are also used by
Borm et al. (2001). Term dependent deposit games are deposit games where the return only
depends on how long capital is deposited, and not on how much is deposited. We show that term
dependent deposit games are totally balanced. Capital dependent deposit games are the natural
counterpart of term dependent deposit games. Here, deposits lead to a different rate of return only
if a different amount of capital is deposited; longer terms do not influence the return. If the rate
of return in capital dependent deposit games is increasing in the amount of capital deposited, a
core element exists. In fact, we can explicitly construct a population monotonic allocation scheme
a la Sprumont (1990).
In a further extension of the model, we allow individuals to also have debt, and we show that
all non-negative superadditive games are deposit games of this type.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce deposit problems
and deposit situations with reinvestment and define corresponding deposit games. In Section 3 we
compare the current model to the one analysed by Borm et al. (2001) and show that it indeed is
an extension. In the next two sections we analyse two specific subclasses of deposit games. Term
dependent deposit games are analysed in Section 4 and in Section 5 capital dependent deposit
games are considered. We show how superadditive games can be rewritten as deposit games with
reinvestment and debt in Section 6.
2 Deposit Problems and Deposit Games with Reinvestment
Similar to Borm et al. (2001), a deposit is defined as a positive, fixed amount of capital c that
is at a bank during a prearranged and consecutive number of periods t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t2, where
1 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ τ . Here τ is the final period in which a deposit can be made. The scope of a deposit
problem is thus a discrete and finite timespan {1, . . . , τ}. The time interval over which money is
deposited is called the term of the deposit
T = {t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t2}.
The set of all possible terms of a deposit is given by
T = {T ⊂ {1, . . . , τ} |∃t1, t2 ∈ {1, . . . , τ} : T = {t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t2} }. (1)
A deposit with capital c and term T = {t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t2} can be represented as a vector over the
periods {1, 2, . . . , τ + 1}, where at the start of period t1 an amount c is deposited and at the start
of period t2 + 1 the amount c is returned. Note that since capital is returned at t2 + 1, we extend
our model to include the period τ + 1.
To illustrate this, we look at a deposit where τ = 3. A possible deposit can be written as
(0, 3, 0,−3), which means that three units of capital (c = 3) are deposited during periods t1 = 2
and t2 = 3, and this is returned at the beginning of period 4, which is t2 + 1.
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The set of all possible deposits is denoted
∆ =
{
δ ∈ Rτ+1 |∃c > 0, T ∈ T : δ = c · h(T )} , (2)
where we define the function h : T → Rτ+1 as a deposit of 1 unit of capital over term T =





1, if t = t1,
−1, if t = t2 + 1,
0, otherwise.
(3)
We assume there is a revenue function P : ∆ → Rτ+1+ that assigns to each deposit δ ∈ ∆ a
non-negative revenue in each period of time in {1, . . . , τ + 1}. No explicit formula for the revenue
function is assumed at this time. Borm et al. (2001) allow revenue to be obtained only in period
τ + 1. This corresponds to Pt(δ) = 0 for all t < τ + 1 and all deposits δ ∈ ∆. If we consider again
τ = 3 and the deposit δ = (0, 3, 0,−3) and assume that we get a 4% interest on it, the revenue is
P (δ) = (0, 0, 0.12, 0.12).
To avoid complications, we assume that money has to be deposited first, and only in a later
period a revenue can be attained1.
Assumption 2.1 For all δ = c · h({t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t2}) ∈ ∆ and all t ≤ t1 we have Pt(δ) = 0.
The capital each individual has available to deposit can come from two sources. The endowments
of the individual constitute the first source of capital, which consists for each time period of the
income of the individual reduced by the consumption of the individual. The endowments are
exogenous and express the net income an individual has available to use for deposits. The second
source is payback of capital that was previously deposited plus revenue from deposits.
The endowments of an individual are given by m ∈ Rτ . Although the endowment can be
negative at some point in time, we assume that for an individual at each time period the cumulative
endowment is non-negative. This boils down to the following assumption.
Assumption 2.2 For all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, we have ∑ts=1 ms ≥ 0.
A deposit problem with final period τ , set of deposits ∆, revenue function P and endowments m
is denoted by (τ, ∆, P, m).
Because an individual has limited endowments, there are only certain combinations of deposits
that he can invest in. A portfolio of deposits is denoted by a function f : ∆ → N ∪ {0}, which
expresses how many units of each deposit are used. A portfolio of deposits an individual is able to
finance with his endowments is called feasible.2 Note that we take into account the possibility of
reinvestment of previously deposited capital and returns.3 The set of all feasible portfolios for an
endowment vector m ∈ Rτ is 4
F(m) =
{
f : ∆ → N ∪ {0}
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} :
∑
δ∈∆






1We also assume that arbitrage is excluded. Conditions to exclude arbitrage are beyond the scope of this paper.
2The endowment of an individual is capital that is available after consumption. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that an individual invests all available capital in deposits in every period in {1, . . . , τ}, since the return on
any deposit is non-negative and any amount of money can be deposited.
3Also, it is possible to get a feasible collection of deposits using the same deposit more than once. It is for
instance possible to open two accounts at the bank and deposit the same amount in each account.
4Even though ∆ is non-denumerable, either side of the equality in the feasibility condition is bounded. At t = 1
there is no revenue by Assumption 2.1, so the right hand side of the equality in the feasibility condition is a finite
number. This implies that a feasible portfolio f : ∆ → N∪{0} is non-zero only for a denumerable number of deposits
3
The left hand side of the equality5 in the feasibility condition represents the net investment in
deposits in period t. It contains not only the capital required for investment in new deposits at
time t, but also the capital returns in period t, according to the definition of deposits in (2) and
(3). Consequently this part of the expression can be negative if less capital is deposited in new
deposits than is paid back from previous deposits.
The right hand side of the equality consists of two parts. The first part are the endowments,
which can be negative. The second part is the sum of the revenue over all deposits at time t, which
is non-negative. Thus the equality states that the net change in investment in deposits is equal to
the endowments plus revenue.
We now define the optimisation problem for an individual in the same way as Borm et al. (2001).
The natural objective is to maximise the total revenue. However, the fact that at any period there
might be some revenue presents us with some difficulties. Because of the non-negativity of the
revenue function it is possible to carry over all intermediate revenue to period τ + 1. Also, from
our definition of a feasible portfolio we see that all available capital is deposited each period. Hence
the natural objective is to maximise the total revenue at time τ + 1.
The total capital of an individual at time τ + 1 consists of two parts; the revenue of deposits
at time τ + 1 and the payback of deposits at τ + 1. Thus the total capital at time τ + 1, Π, as a





Note that the total capital at time τ + 1 also contains the intermediate revenues.
Observe that for two portfolios f ∈ F(m1) and g ∈ F(m2) we have f + g ∈ F(m1 + m2) and
Π(f) + Π(g) =
∑
δ∈∆
(f(δ) + g(δ))[P (δ)− δ]τ+1 = Π(f + g). (4)







∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ F(m)
}
.
We assume that for all m ∈ Rτ+1 this supremum exists.6 Note that π(m) ≥ 0.
Within a cooperative framework, where a group of agents N = {1, . . . , n} combines efforts, it is
possible for individuals to form coalitions and deposit money jointly. If for instance interest rates,
defined as the revenue divided by the amount of capital deposited, are higher when a larger sum of
money is invested, or money is deposited over a longer period, it might be attractive for individuals
to cooperate. In this way, coalitions can possibly make more money than the individuals can when
they act alone. In this way we consider a deposit situation (N, τ, ∆, P, {m(i)}i∈N ), where agent
i ∈ N has endowment vector m(i) ∈ Rτ available to deposit.
with period 1 included in their term. Because of the exclusion of arbitrage, it is impossible to get an unbounded
revenue with a finite amount of capital. Therefore, also in the next period, t = 2, the revenue is bounded, and again
only a denumerable amount of deposits including period 2 can be non-zero. This argument holds for all periods, so
f can only be non-zero for a denumerable amount of deposits. Thus, the sum is well defined.
5In our definition of F(m) it is in fact more natural to consider the restriction as an inequality, Pδ∈∆ f(δ)δt ≤
mt +
P
δ∈∆ f(δ)Pt(δ) for all t. However, it will become apparent later that without loss of generality we can assume
the expression to be an equality, because the non-negativity of the revenue function makes it possible to carry over
any amount of capital to the next period without losses.
6The only concern here is the value of the supremum being infinity. This can only happen if there is the possibility
of arbitrage, which is assumed to be excluded.
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The available capital m(S) to a coalition S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅ is simply the sum of all capital available












∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ F(m(S))
}
. (5)
A deposit game with reinvestment7 corresponding to a deposit situation (N, τ, ∆, P, {m(i)}i∈N ) is
the transferable utility game (N, v) with characteristic function v as given by (5) for all S ⊂ N ,
S 6= ∅. By assumption v(∅) = 0.
The next theorem states that all deposit games are superadditive, i.e. v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for
all S, T ⊂ N such that S ∩ T = ∅. The intuition behind this is that all players in a coalition are
at least able to invest in the same deposits as they would optimally do as smaller coalitions.
Theorem 2.3 Let (N, τ, ∆, P, {m(i)}i∈N ) be a deposit situation with corresponding deposit game
(N, v). Then (N, v) is superadditive.
Proof: Let S, T ⊂ N be such that S ∩ T = ∅. Then
































Π(fS + fT )−
τ∑
t=1
mt(S ∪ T )
∣∣∣∣∣ f







mt(S ∪ T )
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ F(m(S ∪ T ))
}
= v(S ∪ T ),
where the inequality follows from the fact that F(m(S)) ∪ F(m(T )) ⊂ F(m(S) + m(T )). ¤
The natural question that arises is how to divide the maximal joint revenue over the individual
players. To tackle this question we analyse core allocations of the corresponding game. The core













7We add the qualification ”with reinvestment” to make the distinction with deposit games as defined by Borm
et al. (2001). Throughout the remainder, where no confusion arises this qualification is dropped.
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and a core allocation is a vector x ∈ C(v). A core allocation is stable against coalitional deviations,
because every coalition is allocated at least what it can obtain by depositing on its own.
The following example shows that within the general setting of deposit games as developed
above, where we have not put any restrictions on the revenue function P other than the exclusion
of arbitrage opportunities and Assumption 2.1, core elements need not exist. In the next sections
we impose some natural conditions on the revenue function P that ensure stability.
Example 2.1 Consider a three player deposit situation (N, τ, ∆, P, {m(i)}i∈N ) with two periods,
so τ = 2, N = {1, 2, 3} and the set of deposits ∆ is given by (2). Furthermore, assume that
these three players are identical, in the sense that they each have the same endowments. Assume
that the endowments of player i ∈ N are given by m(i) = (300,−50). Note that m(i) satisfies
Assumption 2.2.
The setting we consider consists of only two deposits with non-zero revenue. The first one is
a two-year bond of 500 yielding an interest rate of 6% per period. The second one is a two-year





(0, 2.5, 2.5), if δ = (250, 0,−250),
(0, 30, 30), if δ = (500, 0,−500),
(0, 0, 0), otherwise.
This revenue function satisfies Assumption 2.1.
We now calculate the value of each coalition. Obviously, for every two-player coalition {i, j} it
is optimal to buy one two-year bond of 500. The remaining 100 in the first period can not be used
to get any revenue, but can be carried over to the next period (without interest). In the second
period, the coalition still has 500 deposited, has 100 carried over, receives endowments of −100 and
receives a revenue of 30. This intermediate revenue is carried over. The optimal feasible portfolio
f for any two-player coalition is thus given by8
f(δ) =
{
1, if δ ∈ {(500, 0,−500), (100,−100, 0), (0, 30,−30)},
0, otherwise.
This gives all two-player coalitions a value of v({i, j}) = (30−(−500))+(0−(−30))−(600−100) =
60.
Observe that any single player i ∈ N has insufficient capital to deposit 500. Clearly depositing
in the two-year bond of 250 is optimal, together with a deposit that carries over the intermediate
revenue from t = 2 to t = 3. This results in a value v({i}) = 5. The grand coalition can buy one
two-year bond of 500 and one of 250 in t = 1 and carries over the remaining capital of 150. The
intermediate revenue at period t = 2 is also carried over to period t = 3. This leads to v(N) = 65.
If we want to construct a core element x ∈ R3 for this deposit game, it needs to satisfy several
inequalities. For the two-player coalitions, these are: x1 +x2 ≥ 60, x1 +x3 ≥ 60 and x2 +x3 ≥ 60.
If we add these three inequalities together, we get 2(x1 + x2 + x3) ≥ 180, or x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 90.
However, efficiency tells us that a core allocation x should satisfy x1 + x2 + x3 = 65 < 90. So the
core is empty for this particular deposit game. /
8To clarify further, had the endowments been (300,−60), the deposit (500, 0,−500) would still have been feasible.
In period t = 2 the endowments of the coalition is only 480, however with the intermediate return of 30 from the
mentioned deposit itself, 510 would be available. With endowments (300,−70) however, the deposit would not have
been feasible, since at t = 2 only 490 can be invested in deposits.
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3 Deposit Games with and without Reinvestment
This section compares deposit games with reinvestment to those without reinvestment. To do so,
we first recall the notation used originally by Borm et al. (2001).
The scope of a deposit problem without reinvestment is a finite and discrete timespan {1, . . . , ρ}.
The set of all possible terms of a deposit T is denoted by (1) with τ = ρ.
Borm et al. (2001) denote deposits by d = c · e(T ), where
et(T ) =
{
1, if t1 ≤ t ≤ t2,
0, otherwise, (6)
for all T = {t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t2} ∈ T , t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. The set of all deposits is given by
D =
{
d ∈ Rρ+ |∃c ≥ 0, T ∈ T : d = c · e(T )
}
.
The revenue function is denoted by R : D → R+ with R(0) = 0. R(d) is the revenue of a deposit
d, which is received in period ρ+1. Let N denote the set of all players. The endowments of player
i ∈ N are denoted by a vector ω(i) ∈ Rρ. ωt(i) denotes the total amount of capital available to
player i ∈ N to deposit in period t. For S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅ we define ω(S) = ∑i∈S ω(i). A deposit
situation without reinvestment is denoted by (N, ρ, D,R, {ω(i)}i∈N ).






∣∣∣∣∣∃` ∈ N, ∃d






Theorem 3.1 Every deposit game without reinvestment is a deposit game with reinvestment.
Proof: Consider a deposit game without reinvestment (N, w) corresponding to a deposit
situation (N, ρ, D,R, {ω(i)}i∈N ). We now construct a deposit situation with reinvestment
(N, τ, ∆, P, {m(i)}i∈N ) for which the corresponding deposit game (N, v) is equal to (N,w).
Let τ = ρ, let the set of possible terms T be defined by (1) and let the set of all deposits ∆ be
defined by (2). Note that the interpretation of deposits is the same in both models, so an amount
c is deposited over term T in both cases, so the deposit defined as d = c · e(T ) ∈ D naturally
corresponds to δ = c · h(T ) ∈ ∆. In particular, from (3) and (6) we find for all T ∈ T
ht(T ) =
{
e1(T ), if t = 1,
et(T )− et−1(T ), if t ∈ {2, . . . , τ}.
Moreover, define the revenue function P : ∆ → Rτ+1+ by
Pt(c · h(T )) =
{
R(c · e(T )), if t = τ + 1,
0, otherwise,
for all c > 0 and all T ∈ T . For all i ∈ N , the endowments m(i) ∈ Rτ are recursively defined by
mt(i) =
{
ω1(i), if t = 1,
ωt(i)− ωt−1(i), if t ∈ {2, . . . , τ}.
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∣∣∣∣∣ f : ∆ → N ∪ {0}, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} :
∑
δ∈∆


















∣∣∣∣∣ ∃` ∈ N ∪ {0},∃δ








Pτ+1(ck · h(T k))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃` ∈ N ∪ {0}, ∃c
1, . . . , c` > 0, ∃T 1, . . . , T ` ∈ T :
∀t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} :
∑̀
k=1





Pτ+1(ck · h(T k))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃` ∈ N ∪ {0}, ∃c
1, . . . , c` > 0, ∃T 1, . . . , T ` ∈ T :













Pτ+1(ck · h(T k))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃` ∈ N ∪ {0}, ∃c
1, . . . , c` > 0, ∃T 1, . . . , T ` ∈ T :














Pτ+1(ck · h(T k))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃` ∈ N ∪ {0}, ∃c
1, . . . , c` > 0, ∃T 1, . . . , T ` ∈ T :
∀t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} :
∑̀
k=1





R(ck · e(T k))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃` ∈ N,∃c
1, . . . , c` ≥ 0, ∃T 1, . . . , T ` ∈ T :
∀t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} :
∑̀
k=1







∣∣∣∣∣ ∃` ∈ N,∃d









∣∣∣∣∣ ∃` ∈ N,∃d






where at (*) we use that because the feasible portfolio is non-zero for a denumerable number of
deposits only, the supremum over the revenue of these denumerable many deposits is equal to the
supremum of the sum of the revenue of any finite number of deposits. ¤
4 Term Dependent Deposit Games
From Example 2.1 it is clear that in a deposit situation (N, τ, ∆, P, {m(i)}i∈N ) we need a further
assumption on the revenue function P for the corresponding deposit game to have a non-empty
core. One such assumption leads to term dependent deposit games as first introduced by Borm
et al. (2001). In the underlying term dependent deposit situation, the rate of return on a deposit
only depends on the term of the deposit and not on the amount of money deposited.
Definition A revenue function P : ∆ → Rτ+1+ is called term dependent if it holds for all
t ∈ {1, . . . , τ + 1}, for all deposits δ ∈ ∆ and for all α > 0, that Pt(αδ) = αPt(δ). If the un-
derlying revenue function is term dependent, also the corresponding deposit situation and deposit
game are called term dependent.
Note that in a term dependent deposit situation, for all terms T ∈ T , all ` ∈ N and all















So without loss of generality we can assume that all deposits with the same term t ∈ T can be
combined into an aggregate portfolio deposit.
The following lemma shows that if we have a feasible portfolio for some endowments, then if
we scale these endowments the portfolio that consists of the scaled deposits is feasible for the new
problem, and furthermore its revenue is also scaled in the same manner.
Lemma 4.1 Let m ∈ Rτ , f ∈ F(m) and λ > 0 and define g(λ · δ) = f(δ) for all δ ∈ ∆. Then
g ∈ F(λ ·m) and Π(g) = λ ·Π(f).


































































which proves the second statement. ¤
We now show that for each term dependent deposit game there is a core allocation. For this we use
the notion of balancedness. A cooperative game (N, v) is called balanced if
∑
S⊂N λ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N)
for all functions λ : 2N → R+ satisfying
∑
S⊂N :i∈S λ(S) = 1. A game is called totally balanced
if every subgame (S, v|S) is balanced, where for all S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅ the subgame with respect to
S is defined by v|S(T ) = v(T ) for all T ⊂ S. Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) derived the
following result about the core and balancedness.
Theorem 4.2 (Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967)) Let (N, v) be a cooperative game.
Then C(v) 6= ∅ if and only if (N, v) is balanced.
Theorem 4.3 Every term dependent deposit game with reinvestment is totally balanced.
Proof: Let (N, v) be a deposit game corresponding to a term dependent deposit situation
(N, τ, ∆, P, {m(i)}i∈N ). First we show that (N, v) is balanced. Take λ : 2N → R+ such that∑










































































































∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ F(m(N))
}
= v(N).
Clearly every subgame of a term dependent deposit game is again a term dependent deposit game
corresponding to a term dependent deposit situation. Hence, a term dependent deposit game is
totally balanced. ¤
In fact deposit games with reinvestment span the whole class of non-negative totally balanced
games.
Theorem 4.4 A non-negative cooperative game is totally balanced if and only if it is a term
dependent deposit game with reinvestment.
Proof: Theorem 4.3 already implies one part of this theorem. Moreover Borm et al. (2001) show
that each non-negative totally balanced cooperative game is a term dependent deposit game with-
out reinvestment, and hence using Theorem 3.1 also a deposit game with reinvestment. Moreover,
term dependency of the revenue function of a deposit situation without reinvestment translates
directly into term dependency of the revenue function of the associated deposit situation with
reinvestment as constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1. This concludes the proof. ¤
Theorem 4.4 implies that the classes of term dependent deposit games without reinvestment, term
dependent deposit games with reinvestment and non-negative totally balanced games coincide.
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5 Capital Dependent Deposit Games
Another subclass of deposit games is the class of capital dependent deposit games. In this subclass,
revenues are not assumed to depend on the term of the deposit but just on the amount of capital
invested9. Depositing over multiple periods does not yield any extra revenue compared to investing
only one period ahead several times. Without reinvestment this class was first considered by Borm
et al. (2001).
In an optimum, depositing for longer than one period is never necessary, so capital dependency
can be modelled by assuming that the revenue of deposits with a term longer than one period is
zero.
Definition A revenue function P : ∆ → Rτ+1+ is called capital dependent if for all T ∈ T with |T | >
1 we have Pt(c · h(T )) = 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ + 1} and c > 0. If the underlying revenue function
is capital dependent, also the corresponding deposit situation and deposit game are called capital
dependent.
Following the construction used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we readily see that if a deposit
situation without reinvestment is capital dependent, then so is the constructed deposit situation
with reinvestment.
To refine this subclass even further, we make one additional assumption. If more capital is deposited
in a certain period, more revenue per unit of capital deposited is obtained. This boils down to the
following definition.
Definition A revenue function P : ∆ → Rτ+1+ has increasing returns to scale if the function
Pt(c·h(T ))
c is non-decreasing in c for c > 0 and for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ + 1} and T ∈ T . If the
underlying revenue function has increasing returns to scale, also the corresponding deposit situation
and deposit game are said to have increasing returns to scale.
Throughout the remainder of this section, let (N, v) be a capital dependent deposit game with
increasing returns to scale corresponding to a deposit situation (N, τ, ∆, P, {m(i)}i∈N ). Moreover,
to avoid unnecessary complications, we replace Assumption 2.2 by a stronger assumption. For all
t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} and all i ∈ N we assume ∑ts=1 ms(i) > 0. This ensures that each coalition indeed
makes a deposit each period.
For each coalition S ⊂ N it is obviously optimal to make at most one deposit each period with a
term of one period, and to make it as large as possible. Denote the optimal deposits for coalition
S in period t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} by
δt,S = ct,S · h({t}), (8)













s=1 ms(i) > 0, for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} and all S ⊂ N we have ct,S > 0. The
9The restriction that the revenue of deposits is independent of their term may not seem straightforward if we
only consider deposits at a bank. However, if we expand our view to a broader class of investment products, such
as physical capital, such a restriction is useful.
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corresponding optimal feasible portfolio for coalition S ⊂ N is given by
fS(δ) =
{
1, if δ = δt,S , t ∈ {1, . . . , τ},
0, otherwise. (10)
Theorem 5.4 shows that each deposit game (N, v) has a population monotonic allocation scheme
(pmas). We first recall the definition of a pmas. According to Sprumont (1990) an allocation
scheme {xS}S⊂N,S 6=∅ with xS ∈ RS for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ is called a pmas for a cooperative game




for all S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, and monotonicity if for each U ⊃ S and i ∈ S it holds that
xUi ≥ xSi .
Note that if {xS}S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas, then for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ xS belongs to the core of the game
restricted to S and hence v is totally balanced.
The proof of Theorem 5.4 uses three lemmas. The first lemma provides an explicit formula for the
coalitional values in terms of the optimal deposits for coalitions as stated in (8) and (9). The second
lemma states that larger coalitions have higher returns. The third lemma constructs weights for
each player in a coalition, which are used to determine how to split the revenue of a coalition over
its members.





























































10This lemma does not require increasing returns to scale and holds for all capital dependent deposit games.
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Example 5.1 Consider a deposit situation (N, τ, ∆, P, {m(i)}i∈N ) with N = {1, 2, 3}, τ = 3, ∆
as in (2), where the revenue function P satisfies increasing returns to scale and moreover for all
c > 0 and for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ + 1}
Pt(c · h({t− 1})) =
{
0.05c, if c < 1500,
0.10c, if c ≥ 1500,
and Pt(c ·h(T )) = 0 for all |T | > 1, and finally with m(1) = (800, 200,−450), m(2) = (400,−300, 0)
and m(3) = (200, 600,−200). Observe that the revenue function is capital dependent. Note that
the revenue is only non-zero for deposits made in the previous period, although a capital dependent
revenue function in general does not require this.
Before we calculate the value of the grand coalition, we determine the optimal deposits from
(8) and (9). These deposits are given by (8) where
c1,N = m1(N) = 800 + 400 + 200 = 1400,
c2,N = c1,N + m2(N) + P2(δ1,N ) = 1400 + (200− 300 + 600) + 70 = 1970,
c3,N = c2,N + m3(N) + P3(δ1,N ) + P3(δ2,N ) = 1970− 650 + 0 + 197 = 1517.
It immediately follows from Lemma 5.1 that
v(N) = P2(δ1,N ) + P3(δ1,N ) + P3(δ2,N ) + P4(δ1,N ) + P4(δ2,N ) + P4(δ3,N )
= 70 + 0 + 197 + 0 + 0 + 151.70 = 418.70,
which is the value of the grand coalition. /
The next lemma shows that the optimal amount deposited, ct,S , and the rate of return are both
monotonic in S.
Lemma 5.2 For all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} and S ⊂ U ⊂ N :
ct,S ≤ ct,U ,







Proof: The first statement follows immediately from the fact that F(m(S)) ⊂ F(m(U)). More-














We now construct a specific weight scheme {θS}S⊂N,S 6=∅ with θS ∈ (RS+)τ . These weights represent
for each period in time and for each player within each coalition, how large his contribution is

















, if t ∈ {2, . . . , τ}.
(11)
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Lemma 5.3 For all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} and S ⊂ N ,
∑
i∈S
θSt (i) = 1. (12)
Moreover for all S ⊂ U ⊂ N with i ∈ S,
ct,U · θUt (i) ≥ ct,S · θSt (i). (13)




















































For (13) we also use induction. Let S ⊂ U ⊂ N and i ∈ S. For t = 1 we see
c1,U · θU1 (i) = m1(i) = c1,S · θS1 (i).
Let t ∈ {2, . . . , τ} and assume that for all j ≤ t− 1 it holds that cj,UθUj (i) ≥ cj,SθSj (i). Then, also
using (11) and Lemma 5.2, we find





















































= ct,S · θSt (i).
¤
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Theorem 5.4 Every capital dependent deposit game with reinvestment that has increasing re-
turns to scale has a population monotonic allocation scheme.








for all S ⊂ N , i ∈ S. We show that {xS}S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas. Let S ⊂ N . Recall that to obtain
v(S) we use Lemma 5.1, which states that the value of coalition S is the sum of all revenues using
optimal deposits as in (8) and (9). The allocation scheme {xS}S⊂N,S 6=∅ distributes the revenue in
each period over the players according to the contributions of the players to the total capital of









































































Hence, {xS}S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas. ¤
Sprumont (1990) shows that not all non-negative totally balanced games have a population mono-
tonic allocation scheme. So the class of capital dependent deposit games with reinvestment and
increasing returns to scale forms a proper subclass of deposit games with reinvestment, and these
games are obviously totally balanced.
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Example 5.2 Recall the deposit situation from Example 5.1 where we found the optimal deposits
as well as the value for the grand coalition of the corresponding deposit game. To calculate the
pmas provided in the proof of Theorem 5.4, we first calculate the weights θN of the weight scheme
{θS}S⊂N,S 6=∅ using (11).










, θN1 (2) =
2
7










, θN2 (2) =
12
197










, θN3 (2) =
132
1517








· 70 + 104
197
· 197 + 694
1517
· 151.70 = 213.40,
xN (2) = 45.20,
xN (3) = 160.10,
which is a core allocation of (N, v). It can be extended to the pmas as described in the proof of
Theorem 5.4.
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 124.10 - -
{2} - 32.30 -
{3} - - 83.03
{1, 2} 124.10 32.30 -
{1, 3} 178.70 - 125.55
{2, 3} - 32.30 83.03
N 213.40 45.20 160.10
Table 1: A pmas for the game in Example 5.2.
It is readily observed that Table 1 provides indeed this population monotonic allocation scheme. /
6 Reinvestment and Debt; a characterisation of all non-
negative superadditive games
This section introduces deposit situations with reinvestment that also allow for debt and introduces
the associated games. The main purpose is not to generalise the deposit games with reinvestment
introduced before, but to characterise all non-negative superadditive games. Our framework is
related to the borrowing model introduced by Tan (2000). We define loans as a negative, fixed
amount of capital c that is borrowed from a bank during a prearranged and consecutive number
of periods t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t2, where 1 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ τ . We define τ as the final period in which a
deposit can be made or any amount of money can be borrowed, so the finite and discrete timespan
is {1, . . . , τ}. We define the set of all possible terms of a deposit or a loan T by (1). The set of all
deposits is
∆+ = {δ ∈ Rτ+1|∃c > 0, T ∈ T : δ = c · h(T )}, (14)
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and the set of all loans is
∆− = {δ ∈ Rτ+1|∃c < 0, T ∈ T : δ = c · h(T )}, (15)
where h(T ) is the function defined in (3). We define an endowment m ∈ Rτ as before, and
we assume that for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, we have ∑ts=1 ms ≥ 0. We consider a revenue function
P : ∆+ ∪∆− → Rτ+1. We assume that for deposits revenue is non-negative, while loans are costly
and thus the corresponding revenue is never positive. Formally assume for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ + 1}
{
Pt(δ) ≥ 0, if δ ∈ ∆+
Pt(δ) ≤ 0, if δ ∈ ∆−.
A general assumption we make is that arbitrage is excluded. We also assume that for all δ =
c · h({t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t2}) ∈ ∆+ ∪∆− and all t ≤ t1 we have Pt(δ) = 0.
The set of feasible portfolios is in a natural way extended to
D(m) =
{
f : ∆+ ∪∆− → N ∪ {0}
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} :
∑
δ∈∆+∪∆−











We define a deposit situation with debt (N, τ, ∆+, ∆−, P, {m(i)}i∈N ) for a group of players N ,
where each player i ∈ N has m(i) ∈ Rτ available to deposit. The value of a coalition S ⊂ N in the












i∈S m(i). We assume this supremum exists.
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The inclusion of debt allows for a full characterisation of all non-negative superadditive games.
Theorem 6.1 Each deposit game with reinvestment and debt is superadditive. Moreover, every
non-negative superadditive game is a deposit game with reinvestment and debt.
Proof: The proof of the first statement is identical to that of Theorem 2.3 if we replace the set
of feasible portfolios F by the set of feasible portfolios D that allow for debt.
For the proof of the second statement, let (N, w) be a non-negative superadditive game. We
construct a deposit situation with reinvestment and debt (N, τ, ∆+, ∆−, P, {m(i)}i∈N ), such that
the corresponding game equals (N, w). First define τ = 2|N |, and define ∆+ as in (14) and ∆− as
in (15).
We associate with every period t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} a coalition St ⊂ N , where Sτ = ∅, St1 6= St2 for
all t1 6= t2, and |St1 | ≤ |St2 | for all t1 < t2 < τ . The period associated with coalition S is denoted
by tS ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. Define the endowment m(i) of player i recursively by
m1(i) =
{
w(N), if tS = 1 for some S 3 i,
0, otherwise,
11As before, the exclusion of arbitrage opportunities and the fact that endowments are bounded guarantees the
existence of this supremum.
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w(N), if tS = t for some S 3 i and
∑t−1
r=1 mr(i) = 0,
−w(N), if tS = t for some S /∈ i and
∑t−1
r=1 mr(i) = w(N),
0, otherwise.
So, during periods associated with coalitions to which player i belongs, i has w(N) available to
deposit. Take ε such that




The necessity of this particular upper bound for ε becomes apparent later on. The revenues are








= w({i}), for all i ∈ N,
PtS
(
[w(N) + 2tS ε]h({t{i}})
)





= −2tS ε, for all i ∈ Nand for all S 3 i,
Pτ+1
(
|S|(w(N) + 2tS ε)h({tS})
)
= w(S), for all S ⊂ N.
For all other δ ∈ ∆+ we set Pt(δ) = 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ + 1} and for all other δ ∈ ∆− we set
Pt(δ) = M for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ + 1}, where M is negative and sufficiently small.
We show that it is optimal for each coalition S to make deposits and loans such that its total revenue
at τ + 1 is w(S). First we show that the costs of loans cancel out the intermediate revenues. Next
we show that each coalition S can obtain at least w(S). Finally we show that w(S) is indeed the
highest possible revenue for coalition S.
Let S ⊂ N . Since the objective is to maximise total revenue at time τ + 1, we make a distinction
between intermediate revenue and revenue at τ + 1. The only deposits that have positive inter-
mediate revenue are deposits of the form [w(N) + 2tU ε]h({t{i}}), for all U ⊂ N and all j ∈ N .
Since in period t{i} only player i has capital w(N) to deposit, at least 2tU ε needs to be borrowed.
However, the corresponding revenue is 2tU ε and this cancels out with the costs of the loan one
period later which is −2tU ε. So no intermediate revenue can be carried over to period τ + 1.
The revenue at period τ + 1 can be obtained by two sorts of deposits. First, we consider the
deposits of the form w(N)h({t{i}}) for all i ∈ N . If i ∈ S this deposit can be made. Otherwise,
w(N) needs to be borrowed12, costing w(N) at some point. By non-negativity and superadditivity
w({i}) ≤ w(N), so it is never optimal to borrow capital to make this deposit. A total revenue of∑
i∈S w({i}) can be obtained by S using the deposits of this form.
For |S| > 1 to make the deposit |S|(w(N) + 2tS ε)h({tS}), each player i ∈ S has to make a
deposit [w(N) + 2tS ε]h({t{i}}) and receive 2tS ε revenue in period tS . Therefore, the deposit can
be made by borrowing |S|2tS ε, with revenue −|S|2tS ε that can be paid back in period tS + 1. So
the intermediate revenue and costs of the loans cancel out, and the coalition has revenue w(S) at
time τ + 1. No additional deposits can be made without borrowing at least w(N), in particular
w(N)h({t{i}}) for all i ∈ S is no longer possible without borrowing, and this is never profitable.
So, each player i ∈ S can deposit in only one deposit with non-zero revenue at τ + 1.
12Because 2t{i}ε < w(N) it is never possible to carry player i’s w(N) through to a period t{j} > t{i} for some
j 6= i without borrowing an additional w(N).
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The deposits of the form |U |(w(N)+2tU ε)h({tU}) for all U % S can only be made by borrowing
w(N) · (|U | − |S|) > w(N). Because w(U)− w(N) ≤ 0, this is not profitable.
For each coalition U such that S∩U 6= ∅ and S 6⊂ U , U 6⊂ S, a similar argument holds. Because
each player i ∈ S ∪U can deposit in only one deposit with non-zero revenue at τ +1, making both
the deposits at tS and tU is impossible without borrowing at least w(N), which is not profitable.
It is clear that any coalition S can also obtain a total revenue of
∑t
k=1 v(Sk) for any partition
{S1, S2, . . . , Sk} of S. However, because of superadditivity the revenue is lower in this case, so
the optimal total revenue for the coalition S is w(S). So the deposit game corresponding to this
deposit situation is (N, w). ¤
We see that the construction of Theorem 6.1 depends on loans. The presence of loans ensures
that at the relevant periods in time, money is available to the players, although it has to be repaid
(possibly with interest) later on. So it might be beneficial for some coalition to use loans. The key
in this construction is that it is sometimes not beneficial to use loans, since it is costly, and only
available for a period of time.
If we do not allow debt, it is unclear whether we still have a characterisation of all non-negative
superadditive games. For three players, the classes of deposit games without reinvestment, with
reinvestment and with reinvestment and debt are equal to the class of non-negative superadditive
games. Whether this is true for more than three players remains an open question.
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